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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

RUFFIN V. STATE: TRIAL JUDGES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
MUST STRICTLY FOLLOW THE MARYLAND CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT OR RISK
COMMITTING REVERSIBLE ERROR.

By: Daniel Wechsler
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that trial judges in criminal
trials must strictly follow the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction 2:02 on the presumption of innocence and reasonable
doubt or risk committing reversible error. Ruffin v. State, 394 Md.
355, 906 A.2d 360 (2006). Because the judge altered the pattern
instructions, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial. [d.
Petitioner, James Allen Ruffin ("Ruffin") was convicted of robbery
with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun during the commission of
a felony by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. At trial, the
judge provided the jury with the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction 2:02 ("MPJI-CR 2:02"), which describes how a jury should
determine guilt or innocence based on the concepts of presumption of
innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judge, however, modified MPJI-CR 2:02 in three different
places. First, the judge instructed the jury that the presumption of
innocence remains "until" it is overcome, rather than "unless" it is
overcome. Second, the judge added, "It's not a fanciful doubt, a
whimsical doubt or a capricious doubt," to explain what the term
"reasonable doubt" means. Third, the judge omitted the last sentence
of the instruction, which reads, "However, if you are not satisfied of
the defendant's guilt to that extent, then reasonable doubt exists and
the defendant must be found not guilty."
Ruffin appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which affirmed the lower court's conviction, stating that the
instruction had properly conveyed the State's burden of proof. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on the sole issue of
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whether the jury instructions given by the circuit court judge infringed
upon Ruffin's constitutional right to due process.
The Court began its analysis by highlighting the importance of the
reasonable doubt standard. [d. at 364, 906 A.2d at 365. Included in
both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Court deemed
the reasonable doubt standard to be an indispensable aspect in every
criminal proceeding. [d. Specifically citing Wills v. State, the Court
made clear that a judge's failure to provide instructions concerning the
reasonable doubt standard is never harmless error. Ruffin, 394 Md. at
364, 906 A.2d at 366 (citing Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 376, 620
A.2d 295,298 (1993)).
In Wills, the use of a patterned jury instruction was endorsed, but
not required. Ruffin, 394 Md. at 365, 906 A.2d at 366-67. However,
the concurring opinion in Wills attempted to make it a requirement that
judges closely adhere to MPJI-Cr 2:02. Ruffin, 394 Md. at 365, 906
A.2d at 367. Additionally, the Court pointed out that other practioners
and judges in Maryland, and other jurisdictions have been highly
supportive of using a standard instruction rather than a judge's
personal explanation of the concepts of reasonable doubt and
presumption of innocence. [d. 394 Md. at 366, 906 A.2d at 367.
The Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance, including
State v. Portillo, an Arizona Supreme Court case. Ruffin, 394 Md. at
366, 906 A.2d at 368. In that case, it was held that a jury must be
given a patterned instruction. [d. at 367-68, 906 A.2d at 368 (citing
State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970 (1995)). The Arizona court remarked
that the concept of reasonable doubt is so important to the
determination of a criminal trial that it should not be left to chance.
Ruffin, 394 Md. at 368, 906 A.2d at 368 (citing Portillo, 898 P.2d at
973).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Himple v. State,
advanced a similar argument, stating that a standard instruction is
essential to prevent a judge's temptation to embellish. Ruffin, 394 Md.
at 370, 906 A.2d at 370 (citing Himple v. State, 101 Md. App. 579,
647 A.2d 1240 (1994)). As explained in Himple, many judges are
tempted to alter the instructions because they believe the concepts are
not clear and require further explanation. Ruffin, 394 Md. at 378, 906
A.2d at 370.
In conclusion, the Court decided to follow the same approach for
jury instructions as it did with the Allen charge in Kelly v. State, 270
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Md. 139, 310 A.2d 538 (1973) and its progeny. Ruffin, 394 Md. at
372, 906 A.2d at 370. The Court previously held in Burnette v. State,
that the instructions for an Allen charge must "closely adhere to ABA
standards." Ruffin, 394 Md. at 372, 906 A.2d at 371 (citing Burnette
v. State, 280 Md. 88, 371 A.2d 663 (1977)). The Court reasoned that
if the Allen charge, which is only used in limited circumstances,
requires "close adherence" to a specific set of instructions, so too
should the reasonable doubt standard, which is used in every criminal
case. Ruffin, 394 Md. at 373,906 A.2d at 371.
Conversely, the dissent made clear that prior case law in Maryland
has never required "close adherence" to a standardized instruction. [d.
at 373-74, 906 A.2d at 372. The dissent also noted that the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled that there is no constitutional
requirement for a specific set of jury instructions to be used. [d. at
374, 906 A.2d at 372.
The dissent examined each of Ruffin's three claims. [d. at 375-77,
906 A.2d at 372-74. First, the omission of the last sentence cannot
constitute error because it is a logical conclusion rather than an
additional piece of information; therefore, not adding anything to the
meaning of reasonable doubt. [d. at 375,906 A.2d at 372-73. Second,
the substitution of "until" for "unless" has already been allowed under
previous Maryland case law, and changing one word should not
constitute error when the rest of the instruction was "nearly identical"
to MPJI-Cr 2:02. [d. at 376, 906 A.2d at 373. Third, the additional
sentence added by the judge, regardless of whether or not the use of
which was in error, "still clearly and properly conveyed the principles
underlying reasonable doubt to the jury." [d.
The Court is concerned with uniformity in order to ensure equal
justice for all defendants. While on its face the instructions given to
the jury in this case do not appear to deviate substantially from MPJICr 2:02, it would be a subjective determination as to whether these
changes did in fact mislead individual jurors. Therefore, it is logical to
require "close adherence" to the jury instructions in every case to
ensure due process for every defendant. In light of this ruling, future
Maryland cases will likely be required to define "close adherence."

